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I. INTRODUCTION
In its current study of the division of jurisdiction between the fed-
eral and state court systems, conducted under mandate from Chief Jus-
tice Earl Warren, the American Law Institute tackles the task of
disciplining one of the leading procedural problem children in American
Law-admiralty tort and compensation jurisdiction. The present division
of jurisdiction in admiralty tort and compensation law1 is so uncertain
and unmanageable that it has required the development of a specialized
bar to administer it. The Institute's proposals for revision in this area
do not call for any sweeping changes in the present division of jurisdic-
tion, but they do recommend certain changes in the allocation of cases
between the state courts and the federal courts. In this study we shall
examine the present state of admiralty tort and compensation jurisdic-
tion, the Institute's proposals and the cures they offer, and the alternative
remedies that may be at hand.
II. PRESENT ALLOCATION OF JURISDICTION
Admiralty tort and compensation jurisdiction presently is divided
between federal and state courts in an irrational pattern that has devel-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Mississippi School of Law.
1. Admiralty Tort and compensation law as used herein encompasses remedies of seamen,
maritime workers and others for damages resulting from personal injury or death within
maritime jurisdiction.
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oped through inconsistent grants of jurisdiction by Congress and uncer-
tain reallocations and definitions of these grants by the courts. Congress'
jurisdiction over admiralty matters is derived from Article III, Section
2 of the Constitution, which provides in part: ". . . the judicial power
shall extend . . to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion .... "
The first Congress, acting under this grant of power, gave the lower
federal courts original jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime actions.
The grant was not exclusive; Congress included a "saving to suitors"
clause which reserved to admiralty claimants the right to pursue state
remedies in the state courts. This basic grant of jurisdiction has changed
little since 1789 and presently is embodied in Section 1333 of Title 28
of the United States Code. The section reads in part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive
of the courts of the states, of:
(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, sav-
ing to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they
are otherwise entitled.2
The first Congress also established the concept of diversity juris-
diction, which grants a party the right to seek enforcement in a federal
court of a claim arising under state law if (1) one of the parties is a cit-
izen of another state, and (2) the amount in controversy exceeds an
amount fixed by statute, now set at $10,000. Thus when the federal
lower court system went into operation, this was the division of juris-
diction of admiralty tort and compensation claims:
(1) Claims seeking enforcement of the traditional admiralty
remedies4 could be brought in federal court, on the "admiralty"
side, for trial without a jury.
(2) Any remedy that the common law was competent to give,
including state tort and wrongful death actions, could be
brought in state court under the "saving to suitors" clause;
actions on these remedies could also be commenced on the
"law" side of federal court, if the requisites of diversity juris-
diction were present. A case reaching the "law" side of the
federal court, unlike a case reaching the "admiralty" side of
the same court, was triable to a jury.5
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (1964).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1964).
4. These remedies are unseaworthiness, under which a seaman can recover damages for
injuries caused by the "unseaworthiness" of the vessel, and maintenance and cure, an early
kind of workmen's compensation that covers seamen who are injured or become ill on a
voyage.
5. The reason for the distinction is that by tradition trial by jury is foreign to
admiralty. The origin of the tradition is unknown. See Frank, Historical Bases of the
Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 7, n.29 (1948). The tradition is
not surviving. In Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963), the Supreme
Court held that a maintenance and cure claim, which arises in admiralty, must be sub-
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These traditional remedies and the allocation of jurisdiction over
them have remained basically unchanged for almost 200 years. In 1920,
Congress enacted the Jones Act,6 the first of several acts designed to
broaden the tort and compensation remedies of maritime workers. The
Act gives a seaman a cause of action against his employer for damages
resulting from personal injuries sustained in the course of his employ-
ment; the remedy is based upon a showing of negligence rather than the
unseaworthiness of the vessel. Jurisdiction over Jones Act cases is con-
current between state and federal courts, without the right of removal.
Then in 1920 Congress passed the Death on the High Seas Act7 for the
purpose of providing an admiralty remedy for wrongful death occurring
on the high seas. Prior to the Act, survivors of a person whose death re-
sulted from wrongful act on the high seas had no remedy at law or in
admiralty unless the cause came within the coverage of a state wrongful
death statute. In the Death on the High Seas Act, Congress failed to
state whether the remedy was intended to be exclusive. Some federal
courts have since held that the Act does not exclude the application by
a state court of any applicable state wrongful death statute, with the
result that jurisdiction over deaths occurring on the high seas is some-
times concurrent.8 In 1927, in an effort to grant compensation coverage
to harbor workers injured on navigable waters, Congress passed the
Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Act.9 Under the Act, jurisdiction
sometimes depends upon the choice of the plaintiff, and sometimes upon
a finding of fact made during trial on the merits.
The courts have held that admiralty jurisdiction extends only to
navigable waters but have vacillated in their decisions as to what con-
stitutes navigable waters. Navigable waters may include a drydock and
a gangplank but exclude, sometimes, a pier and wharf; they may include
a ship being repaired but exclude a ship being built, even though the ship
is launched and afloat. Jurisdiction in this field, however, is not always
limited to navigable waters; since the Jones Act was enacted under both
the commerce power and the admiralty power it can be applied to cover
injuries sustained by "seamen" on dry land.1" Here, again, the courts
mitted to a jury when it is joined with a Jones Act claim, which is a statutory remedy
triable to a jury. The Fitzgerald doctrine has since been extended by lower federal courts.
See p. 00 infra. An express repudiation of the tradition was made recently in Close v.
Calmar Steamship Corp., 44 F.R.D. 398, 407 (E.D. Pa. 1968), a case in which the court
said the tradition was "no longer supported by viable policy considerations."
6. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
7. 46 U.S.C. § 761 et seq. (1964).
8. The results reached by some courts that embrace the theory that the act is not ex-
clusive indicate the need for a revision of the substantive law. One federal court has ruled
that although the act excludes recovery for damages for pain and suffering, the remedies
provided by the act are not exclusive, and a claimant could recover damages for pain and
suffering under a state statute after first recovering damages for pecuniary loss under the
Death on the High Seas Act. Petition of Gulf Oil Corp., 172 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
9. 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1964).
10. Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1 (1946).
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have been unable to deliver a definition of "seaman" that sufficiently
forewarns a potential victim or a litigant of his rights, if any, under the
Act.
The law, thusly developed, appears to be that sometimes there is
concurrent jurisdiction and sometimes the federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over acts that sometimes must occur on navigable waters
and sometimes may occur on dry land.
III. GOAL OF THE REVISION
An assessment of the Institute's proposals and any alternative
choices cannot intelligently be made without an understanding of the
purpose of the revision. In seeking the assistance of the Institute, Chief
Justice Warren cited the "constant upward trend" in the volume of fed-
eral cases, and set as the goal of any revision "a proper jurisdictional
balance between the Federal and State court systems, assigning to each
system those cases most appropriate in the light of the basic principles
of federalism.""
Thus the goal of the Institute's revision must be to allocate to the
courts of each sovereign those cases in which the sovereign has a vital
interest; it is best summed up by Professor Charles A. Wright, one of
the Institute's reporters, in these words:
The goal must be not to get cases out of federal courts, but to
get out of federal courts the cases that do not belong there. ..
With this goal in mind, let us examine the Institute's proposals.
IV. PROPOSALS OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
In the area of admiralty tort and compensation jurisdiction, the
Institute proposes to achieve the proper jurisdictional balance between
the state and federal systems by adopting a plan of concurrent jurisdic-
tion. Proposed Article 1316(b)" grants exclusive jurisdiction to federal
courts in maritime actions in rem and in actions involving the limitation
of a shipowner's liability. 4 Jurisdiction over all other maritime actions,
including unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, Jones Act cases, and
actions under the Death on the High Seas and Longshoreman's and
Harbor Worker's acts, is made concurrent between federal and state
courts. Proposed Sections 1330(1) and 1301(f) prohibit federal courts
11. ALl, STUDY OF THE DIvIsION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS,
Official Draft, Part I, Foreward (Official Draft 1965).
12. Wright, The Federal Courts-A Century After Appomattox, 52 A.B.A.J. 742, 746
(1966).
13. ALI, STUDY OF TE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
§ 1316 (Tent. Draft. No. 6, 1968). All references in the text to the proposed section are to
this draft.
14. 46 U.S.C. §§ 183-89 (1964).
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from adjudicating state workmen's compensation claims." Removal to
federal court is prohibited in Jones Act cases; all other actions are re-
movable, under proposed Section 1317(a), if diversity jurisdiction is
present.
The proposals, by the Institute's own admission, make no substan-
tial reallocation of cases, but if adopted will remove many of the proce-
dural problems in the field. The proposals also have shortcomings. The
major one is the failure to adopt a plan of exclusive state jurisdiction
over those admiralty matters which are peculiarly within the interest
of the states.
V. THE CASE FOR EXCLUSIVE STATE JURISDICTION
The traditional pattern of concurrent jurisdiction in admiralty tort
and compensation law, and the Institute's reaffirmation of the pattern,
forces one to consider the case for exclusive jurisdiction, for if it is con-
ceded that either of two court systems can handle a field of law, one must
next ask if one of the two can handle it better than the other, or can
handle it better than both of them together. Logic thus impels us to
weigh the Institute's proposal for concurrent jurisdiction in the light
of exclusive state or exclusive federal jurisdiction.
The main thrust of the arguments for exclusive federal jurisdiction
is that admiralty law is federal law and best can be applied by federal
courts. Proponents of exclusive federal jurisdiction also cite the fact
that most admiralty tort and compensation cases are being litigated in
federal courts under the existing division of jurisdiction. Justice Brennan,
in his dissenting opinion in Romero v. International Terminal Oper-
ating Co.,' 6 points out that during a recent five-year period only about
150 admiralty cases were brought in the state courts. Some of the com-
mentators also urge a unification of the federal and state court systems,
which, presumably, would leave us with only one system-a federal one.
The contention that federal courts should exercise exclusive juris-
diction over admiralty tort and compensation matters because the law
that is being applied is federal law has questionable merit. With the
exception of maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness, the federal law
that is being applied is neither unique nor a novel creature of the federal
government. The Jones Act and the Death on the High Seas Act basi-
cally represent extensions to admiralty of common law negligence and
wrongful death remedies that were developed under state law and that
would otherwise be available to the claimant if the action had occurred
on dry land. The Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Act was pat-
terned after the New York workmen's compensation statute and was
15. The prohibition was removed from the revision by the American Law Institute at
its 1968 Annual Meeting, however.
16. 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
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adopted by Congress after two unsuccessful attempts by that body to
bring longshoremen and harbor workers within the coverage of state
compensation acts.' 7 Admiralty tort and compensation law is federal
law, but most of it is, in reality, only the extension by the federal gov-
ernment of state-developed law to those areas outside the jurisdiction
of the states. In view of these considerations, the argument that federal
courts should be granted exclusive jurisdiction because admiralty tort
and compensation law is federal law loses much of its force.
The small volume of admiralty cases filed in state courts in recent
years does not indicate necessarily that claimants prefer to litigate these
types of claims in federal court. Since federal courts have jurisdiction
over all admiralty tort and compensation remedies, but state courts have
jurisdiction only over some of these remedies, attorneys normally can
be expected to choose the federal forum and avoid any problems of ju-
risdiction.
Although an argument for exclusive federal jurisdiction can be
made, a study of the major considerations tips the scales against exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction and toward exclusive state jurisdiction. Here,
briefly, are the major arguments in the case for exclusive state juris-
diction:
A. The State Courts are Competent to Handle these Cases
There should be no question as to the competency of the state courts.
Congress in its first allocation of admiralty jurisdiction reserved con-
current jurisdiction to the states, and subsequently, in the Jones Act,
granted more admiralty jurisdiction to state courts. The broad grant of
concurrent jurisdiction by the American Law Institute in its proposed
revision is an acknowledgement by it that the state courts are capable
of handling all of these kinds of admiralty matters. A similar view is
held by many commentators. Professor Charles L. Black, Jr., sums up
the case for state court competence thusly:
The common law courts are thoroughly used to such cases, and
handling them may be looked on as part of the expertise of the
common law bench and bar, as it could not be expected to be
of admiralty. Under the saving clause and the Jones Act, the
common law courts have experienced no difficulty in handling
maritime injury cases, and there is no reason to anticipate that
the trouble would increase if all of them went into state
courts . . 8
17. 40 Stat. 395 (1917); 42 Stat. 634 (1922). Both statutes were declared unconstitu-
tional as improper delegations of legislative power. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253
U.S. 149 (1920); Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
18. Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 CoLUM. L. Rav. 259,
278 (1950).
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B. The Federal Court System is Becoming Increasingly
Unable to Handle these Cases
As the areas of federal concern are expanded by Congress, the fed-
eral court system is becoming hopelessly overburdened.19 Admittedly
no great volume of admiralty tort and compensation cases is escaping
the federal system at this time, but no reallocation of jurisdiction should
place any additional case load on the federal system when the federal
system is crowded and where, as we shall see, the federal government
has no crucial interest in the substance of the additional case load. Pro-
ponents of exclusive federal jurisdiction, or of concurrent jurisdiction,
argue that the state court systems are also over-burdened. That assump-
tion, even if true, does not diminish the force of the argument for exclu-
sive state jurisdiction. Even though some state court systems also may
be overburdened, it is reasonable to assume that as the federal govern-
ment continues to expand its regulatory powers into traditional state law
areas, the burden on state courts will either decrease or at least will not
increase at a rate as great as that of the federal system.20 Even assum-
ing that the federal dockets will not increase in the future at a rate faster
than that of state dockets, it would appear more logical to impose the
burden of increasing the judicial personnel and facilities needed to handle
admiralty tort and compensation claims upon those states whose res-
idents, either as shipowners or as maritime workers, derive direct benefit
from prompt disposition of these types of cases.
C. The States Have a Greater Interest in these Cases than does
the Federal Government
Federal courts were created and continue in existence to handle
those cases in which there is a unique federal interest 21-those cases that
a state court can not be expected to handle properly in view of the unique-
ness of the federal interest and the possible conflict between that interest
and the interests of the state. Proper promotion of federal policy demands
that federal courts handle cases involving civil rights, due process, anti-
trust violations and like matters of unique and compelling federal in-
terest. Because of the historical alliance between admiralty and the
Federal Government, one may assume that there is a unique federal in-
19. The total caseload in the U.S. courts of appeal increased from 3,899 in 1960 to
6,548 in 1966, and is expected to increase to almst 11,000 by 1975. Cases under submission for
more than three months in the courts of appeal increased almost 400% from 1960 to 1966.
SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMPROVEMENT IN JUDICIAL MACHINERY, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
CRISIS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, 74 (Comm. Print 1967).
20. From 1960 to 1965 the number of civil cases commenced in federal district courts
increased 14 per cent, and the backlog increased 21 per cent. See Wright, The Federal
Courts-A Century After Appomattox, supra note 12 at 742. For further discussion of the
present state of federal court dockets, see Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in
Judicial Administration, 42 TEx. L. REV. 949 (1964).
21. See Wright, The Federal Courts-A Century After Appomattox, supra note 12 at 742.
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
terest in tort and compensation remedies for seamen and maritime work-
ers. Such is not the case, however. The Federal Government may have
had a special interest in maritime workers in the early days of the Re-
public; indeed, one may speculate how strong this interest was in 1783,
when the nation consisted of thirteen separate states that together formed
the only significant nation in the Western Hemisphere. There were no
railroads, airplanes, telephones or telegraph, and no automobiles or de-
veloped road systems. Most of the communication, transportation, and
trade between the states and with foreign nations was over navigable
waters. The American navy was the bulwark in national defense. In 1789
there was a unique federal interest in seamen and maritime workers, but
that interest has evaporated with the rise of the jet age and the decline
of the importance of maritime shipping to American commerce and na-
tional defense.22
If there is any federal interest in admiralty today, it is in the super-
vision of the commercial law of admiralty and the regulation of ships in
their use of American ports. Since a court must assess blame in a colli-
sion of ocean-going vessels or the seizure of a ship which is in interna-
tional commerce, it may be argued that these types of cases are of
peculiar federal interest. There are also limited instances in which ad-
miralty tort and compensation matters might merit the case-by-case
supervision of a federal trial court. Where the Federal Government, a
state other than the state of the forum, or a foreign defendant is a party,
comity among sovereigns might impel jurisdiction in a federal tribunal.
Comity among states also makes it desirable to grant exclusive jurisdic-
tion to federal courts over limitation of liability actions, as such actions
may make it necessary for the court in which they are filed to enjoin
other courts from proceeding with other causes. It may also be argued
that federal interest in the free flow of maritime commerce between
states and with foreign nations is such that maritime liens and other mar-
itime actions in rem should be enforced only under the eye of a federal
court.2 3 Except in these limited instances, in which jurisdiction perhaps
should be made exclusive in the federal courts, there is little federal in-
terest in admiralty tort and compensation cases; there is certainly no
22. During the period of the early development of admiralty law, maritime workers
assumed in law the status of "wards" of admiralty. This judicial attitude apparently was
based upon considerations of public defense and the character of seamen. "Special laws for
seamen not only protected the childlike and improvident seaman (who is usually 'poor and
friendless' and apt to acquire 'habits of gross indulgence, carelessness and improvidence'),
but served 'the great public policy of preserving this important class of citizens for the
commercial service and maritime defense of the nation.'" G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, Th
LAW OF ADMIRALTY 253 (1957). See also Lovitt, Things are Seldom What They Seem: The
Jolly Little Wards of the Admiralty, 46 A.B.A.J. 171 (1960).
23. Admiralty grants seamen liens against their vessels as security for their wages and
for compensation. Such liens are no longer necessary where the shipowner is an American
citizen, and should be abolished in those situations. The liens will be needed in those instances
where the shipowner is a foreigner, but since the proposal for exclusive state jurisdiction
would allocate those causes to the federal courts, no problem would arise.
1969]
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federal interest in these cases sufficient to merit case-by-case regulation
by overburdened federal trial courts. The federal interest, if any, in
these cases is confined to maintaining uniformity and seeing that the
federal policies and protections are carried out.
One cannot conclude that there is any unique federal interest in
tort and compensation claims of maritime workers because maritime
shipping is a major method of interstate and foreign travel and trans-
portation. If such a connection made the interest vital, then it would be
logical to assume that a similar interest would exist as to workers in the
air transport or trucking industries, either of which involves interna-
tional or interstate commerce equal to that of the maritime industry.
Yet Congress has not chosen to add to or regulate the tort and compen-
sation remedies of air transport or trucking employees.24
If there is a unique interest of a sovereign in these kinds of cases,
such an interest rests with the state in which the maritime accident
occurs, or with the state in which the victim is domiciled; in most in-
stances, the two will be the same. Deterrence is one of the major goals
of accident law, and the state of the place of the accident has a strong
interest in the day-to-day supervision of litigation involving industrial
or other accidents, whether on dry land or on water. The state of the
domicile of the victim has a unique interest in the speedy and proper
disposition of the victim's cause, for it is the sovereign in which the claim-
ant, his family, his creditors, and, many times, the defendant reside.
Concurrent jurisdiction is in itself an argument for exclusive state
jurisdiction. If any judicial expertise is needed for day-to-day super-
vision of admiralty tort and compensation cases, then concurrent juris-
diction will divide the cases between the two systems and hinder the
development of this expertise by either system. If the American Law
Institute makes jurisdiction concurrent, then it must be assumed that
such expertise is not required and, unless there is a unique federal in-
terest in the tort and compensation claims of maritime workers, there
is no justification for any federal jurisdiction.
24. A bill (S. 4089, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), to provide federal jurisdiction and a
body of uniform federal substantive law for cases arising out of aviation accidents was
introduced recently by Senator Tyings. It is probable, however, that the bill was moti-
vated primarily by a desire to eliminate problems of jurisdiction and multiple litigation
arising out of the multitude of claims generated by modern-day crashes. Two provisions
of the bill indicate that protection of airline workers was not considered important by the
drafters of the bill. One provision makes contributory negligence a bar to recovery.
Another provision makes the right of action granted by the bill inapplicable where it would
be inconsistent with the provisions or intent of any workmen's or employees' compensation
statute. State compensation statutes usually can be applied to accidents occurring outside the
state's borders, and it has been held that where a state compensation statute can be applied,
the Death on the High Seas Act does not apply. King v. Pan American World Airways, 270
F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 928 (1960). Since the Tydings bill con-
tains language similar to that contained in the Death on the High Seas Act and applied in
the King case to bring a claimant exclusively under the state compensation act, it is
doubtful that the Tydings bill, if enacted, would afford much protection for airline workers.
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Except in the few limited cases previously discussed, the federal
interest in maritime tort and compensation cases is at most an interest
in the uniform supervision of the remedies granted by federal law and
supplemented by state law. This interest can be satisfied without clogging
the federal court system with thousands of ordinary personal injury and
workmen's compensation cases which occur on or near the water. It can
be satisfied through Congressional policy-making legislation, and judi-
cial supervision by the Supreme Court under its inherent right to review
judgments of state courts. The interest of the states in the processing
of routine admiralty tort and compensation cases is much greater than
any such interest by the Federal Government. State courts are fully
competent to handle these types of claims; the federal courts, because
of the press of vital federal matters, are becoming less and less competent
to do so. In such an atmosphere, any allocation of cases that lets juris-
diction over routine admiralty tort and compensation causes remain in
the federal courts cannot be said to have taken out of the federal courts
all of those cases that do not belong there.
Despite these convincing arguments, the Institute has chosen to
adopt a standard of concurrent jurisdiction over admiralty tort and com-
pensation cases. The Institute's reallocation, while it falls short of the
goal of the revision, does make needed improvements in existing law.
Let us examine the application of the Institute's proposals to the major
problem areas in this field of law.
VI. THE LOCALITY OF THE TORT
A claimant injured on or near the water must determine at the
outset whether his claim is in admiralty or whether it is under a state
remedy. On such a determination hinges decisions as to which court has
the power to adjudicate the claim, what damages may be recovered,
what allegations and proof are necessary, and when the claim will be
prescribed. Thus the uncertainty that currently exists as to the line be-
tween admiralty and non-admiralty remedies often results in hardship
or injustice to an admiralty claimant.
Generally, the law is that the locality of the tort determines if a
tort claim is in admiralty. The rule, as enunciated in The Plymouth,25
is that:
Every species of tort, however occurring, and whether on board
a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is
of admiralty cognizance .... 26
Strict adherence to this doctrine has led to such illogical results as in-
cluding within admiralty a wrongful death claim arising out of a plane
25. 70 U.S. (3 Wall) 20 (1865).
26. Id. at 36.
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crash into Boston Harbor and excluding a claim by a seaman injured
while standing on the dock casting off the mooring lines of a ship. In
some instances, the decision for or against admiralty tort jurisdiction
has hinged upon whether a ship's ladder broke at the top or at the bot-
tom. The absurdity of strict adherence to the locality alone test was
demonstrated by Justice Henry Billings Brown in an article written in
1909,27 in which he alluded to the ladder cases and then posed this ques-
tion: if the locality test is valid, then must an action for slander com-
mitted on a ship be an admiralty claim?
It can be argued that the "locality alone" test is not settled law,
and that the Supreme Court expressly left the matter open for further
development by its holding in Atlantic Transport Co. of West Vir-
ginia v. Imbrovek.28 In that case Justice Hughes, speaking for a unan-
imous court, indicated that perhaps something more than the mere
locality of the tort must be present to warrant admiralty jurisdiction. In
the 55 years since Imbrovek, however, only one appellate case departs
from the "locality alone" test. In Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe
Farms,29 a claimant had sustained injuries as a result of a dive from the
side of a pier on a lake into approximately 18 inches of water; the alleged
negligence was the failure of the municipality, which owned and oper-
ated the pier, to warn against the dangers of diving from it. The Sixth
Circuit, in denying claimant's libel in admiralty, rejected the "locality
alone" test and enunciated another test, which may be labeled the "lo-
cality and relationship" test. The Court held:
While the locality alone test should properly be used to exclude
from admiralty courts those cases in which the tort giving rise
to the lawsuit occurred on land rather than on some navigable
body of water, it is here determined that jurisdiction may not
be based solely on the locality criterion. A relationship must
exist between the wrong and some maritime services, naviga-
tion or commerce on navigable waters. .... 10
In reaching the conclusion that the relationship of the tort to mar-
itime service, navigation or commerce on navigable waters is a "condition
sub silentio" to admiralty tort jurisdiction, the Sixth Circuit relied upon
the language in Imbrovek and upon the holding by a district court in
New York that a bather injured in navigable waters adjoining a beach
could not seek damages in admiralty." No application for certiorari was
made in the Chapman case, and it stands as the last appellate voice on
the subject.
27. Brown, Jurisdiction of the Admiralty in Cases of Tort, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1909).
28. 234 U.S. 52 (1914).
29. 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967).
30. Id. at 966.
31. McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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It is perhaps too early to tell what effect Chapman will have on
subsequent federal jurisprudence, but the decision has failed to move
five of the six district courts who have decided "locality" cases since
it was handed down. In McCall v. Susquehanna Electric Co.,3 2 the
district judge cited The Plymouth and held that even though the neg-
ligent act was performed on land, the injury occurred on water and the
claim was thus within admiralty under the "locality" test. The "locality
alone" theory was followed, without discussion of Chapman, in four
other cases.33 In one of the cases, Dagger v. U.S.N.S. Sands,34 a claimant
was injured while inspecting a ship under construction. The district
court acknowledged that any action arising out of the contract for the
construction of the ship on which the accident occurred would not be
cognizable in admiralty, but ruled that
jurisdiction over a cause of action based upon the commission
of a tort ... is not dependent upon the condition of the vessel
on which the tort occurred but upon the occurrence of an event
on navigable waters .... 11
The Chapman doctrine was followed in Smith v. Guerrant,8 a
case involving a claim for damages sustained when machinery being re-
moved from a jetty to a wharf (neither of which are "navigable waters"
under admiralty law) tumbled into navigable water. All parties to the
suit apparently agreed that the claim was within admiralty, but the dis-
trict court, on its own motion, dismissed the claim, holding that "locality
alone" was not sufficient to give admiralty jurisdiction. The court noted:
Disputes like the present one, which is only incidentally related
to navigable waters and wholly unconnected with maritime com-
merce, can be litigated in state courts under the diverse rules
of state law without affecting maritime endeavors. The basis
for the special grant of admiralty jurisdiction is absent here."'
The Institute's revision rescinds the "locality alone" test but offers
no substitute.38 The reporters apparently favor a "locality and relation-
ship" test similar to that used in the Chapman case, 9 but they leave the
adoption and development of such a test to the courts. One danger in the
32. 278 F. Supp. 209 (D. Md. 1968).
33. Rogers v. M/V Ralph Bollinger, 279 F. Supp. 92 (E.D. La. 1969); Dagger v. U.S.N.S.
Sands, 287 F. Supp. 949 (S.D. W. Va. 1966); Hornsby v. Fishmeal Co., 285 F. Supp. 990
(W.D. La. 1968); DiPaola v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 294 F. Supp. 736 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
34. See note 33 supra.
35. Id. at 941.
36. 290 F. Supp. 111 (S.D. Tex. 1968) ; the Sixth Circuit recently followed its Chapman
decision in Gowdy v. United States, 412 F.2d 525 (6th Cir. 1969).
37. Id. at 113.
38. ALI proposed § 1316(a). See appendix.
39. ALI, STUDY OF THE DmsIoN OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
144 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1968).
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Institute's approach is that the "locality alone" test is so ingrained in
jurisprudence that it is unlikely that a statutory rescission of the test,
without more, will alter the thinking of the judiciary. For example, in
Davis v. City of Jacksonville Beach,4" a case arising out of a collision be-
tween a swimmer and a surfboard, the court held that locality alone was
enough to give jurisdiction in admiralty, but reasoned that even if some
further maritime connection was required, it was present because a
surfboard potentially can interfere with maritime trade and commerce.
As long as such a judicial attitude exists, it is doubtful that a pro-
nouncement more specific than that contained in the Institute's proposal'
would deter those courts that desired to adhere to the "locality alone"
doctrine.4 2 A specific delimitation of admiralty tort jurisdiction narrow
enough to prevent rulings as in the Davis case might result in the exclu-
sion from admiralty jurisdiction of some causes that actually belong
there; one wonders, for example, how a statute could be worded which
would exclude from admiralty pleasure boat accidents, except for those
cases in which the general maritime interest requires that admiralty reg-
ulate the effects of such accidents. Considering the difficulties and dan-
gers in elaboration, the Institute appears to have followed the wiser
course.
The greatest harm done by the uncertainty surrounding the "lo-
cality alone" test is the possibility of litigation of a case in federal court
that should have been litigated in state court, or vice versa, with re-
sulting multiplicity of actions and possible substantial prejudice to
claimants. The Institute's adoption of concurrent jurisdiction will allow
a claimant to litigate the admiralty and common law remedies in the
alternative in one action in either the federal or the state court, so that
if the "locality alone" doctrine persists after the adoption of the revi-
sion, it will not provoke any procedural hardship.
VII. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: THE TWILIGHT ZONE AND Calbeck
Perhaps in no other area of procedural law has there been as much
confusion and uncertainty as in the area of compensation for maritime
workers other than seamen. The law in this area began on the wrong foot:
since longshoremen and harbor workers were not seamen, they could
not recover compensation from an employer for an on-the-job injury
occurring on navigable waters under maintenance and cure or other ad-
miralty remedies; since the federal jurisdiction over navigable waters
was exclusive, these workers, injured while on navigable waters, could
40. 251 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Fla. 1965).
41. Supra note 36.
42. Those courts inclined to reject the "locality alone" test will find sufficient statutory
authority in proposed § 1316(a). In Smith v. Guerrant, 290 F. Supp. 111 (S.D. Tex. 1968),
for example, the court reached its conclusion that "locality alone" was insufficient by "con-
struing" present § 1333, the language of which is much more favorable to the "locality
alone" test than that of the ALI's proposal.
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not recover under any state compensation law. This conclusion, reached
in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,43 has worked upon harbor workers
a burden so harsh that the Supreme Court has spent 50 years trying to
circumvent it. The Court first established the "maritime but local" doc-
trine, allowing the workers to recover under the state workmen's com-
pensation statute even though the injury was on navigable waters, in
those situations in which the matter was maritime but was of local con-
cern and no violence would be done to the federal law by the application
of the state law. In 1927 Congress passed the Longshoreman's and Har-
bor Worker's Act, which established a federal compensation remedy;
the law, however, was designed to apply only to injuries occurring on
navigable waters, and only if no state compensation statute was appli-
cable.44 The Act was designed to fill the gap between state law and the
remedies of seamen. The inherent difficulty in defining "navigable wa-
ters" and the resulting harm to some admiralty claimants prompted the
Supreme Court to establish the "twilight zone," first defined in the case
of Davis v. Department of Labor & Industries.45 The Court has fixed
the "twilight zone" as that area involving mixed elements of land and
maritime jurisdiction, and has decreed that in cases falling within the
zone, courts should uphold the administrative findings of jurisdictional
facts, or the valid choice of the claimant. Some states and some federal
circuits, however, have not followed the doctrine, and this has led to
continuing uncertainty.4
The Supreme Court in Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co.4 1 ig-
nored the express language of the Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's
Act and ruled that when an accident occurs on navigable waters, the
federal act can be applied, even if the state act also could be applied.
As a result, much of the uncertainty in this area has been removed, and
jurisdiction is presently allotted in this manner:
If the injury occurs on navigable waters, then the federal act
can apply, or, if the matter is one of local concern, the state
act also can apply; the choice will rest with the claimant.
If the act occurs other than on navigable waters, the state act
applies.
If the claimant is a seaman, the act does not apply and the
claimant's remedy is under the Jones Act or other maritime
remedies.
There are indications that the law will not stabilize at the Calbeck
43. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
44. The Act, 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1964), provides that "compensation shall be payable
• . . only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable
waters of the United States . . . and if recovery for the disability or death through work-
men's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by state law ..
45. 317 U.S. 249 (1942).
46. See Note, 44 ORE. L. Rav. 112 (1965).
47. 370 U.S. 114 (1962).
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level, however. The Fourth Circuit recently held in Marine Stevedoring
Corp. v. Oosting4" that injury to a longshoreman sustained on a pier,
which is in admiralty traditionally considered dry land, is compensable
under the Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Act. In reaching its
conclusion, the Court reasoned that since small vessels were able to nav-
igate beneath the pier in question, the accident occurred "above" nav-
igable waters, and, like injuries sustained by persons flying over water,49
was within the jurisdictional scope of the phrase "upon navigable wa-
ters."50 A writ of certiorari has been granted by the Supreme Court.51
Unless the court rejects the rationale of the case, the decision will create
more uncertainty in this area of the law.
It must be assumed that in any borderline case, the claimant will bring
his cause in a court that can apply either the federal or the state com-
pensation statute. If this is so, one of the Institute's original proposals
would have had the effect of moving most of these borderline cases out
of the federal courts and into the state courts. The Institute initially
proposed to grant concurrent jurisdiction over all Longshoreman's and
Harbor Worker's Act cases, but to deny federal courts any jurisdiction
over state workmen's compensation claims. 2 If the plan had been adop-
ted, and in view of the continued uncertainty in the application and
limitation of the "twilight zone" and Calbeck doctrines, attorneys could
have been expected to choose in any doubtful case the state forum with
its freedom to apply both remedies. The Institute, however, rejected
the proposal to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts over state com-
pensation claims, and its final draft will allow both state and federal
courts to apply both the federal and state compensation remedies of
longshoremen and harbor workers.
VIII. JURY TRIALS
Although apparently no one contends that admiralty tort and com-
pensation claimants should be denied the right of trial by jury, present
law withholds the right from some of those claimants. Claimants pur-
suing their claims under "savings clause" remedies in either the state
court or, under diversity jurisdiction, in the federal court, are entitled
to trial by jury. Jones Act claimants are also entitled to trial by jury,
whether the claim is pursued in state court or in federal court. Claimants
pursuing other admiralty remedies in federal court, however, are denied
trial by jury unless the diversity jurisdiction requirements are met. The
rationale behind this illogical distinction is that in theory the federal
48. 398 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1968).
49. See D'Aleman v. Pan American World Airways, 259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1958).
50. 398 F.2d at 908.
51. 393 U.S. 976 (1969). There are conflicting decisions from other circuits. See Houser
v. O'Leary, 383 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1967).
52. Proposed §§ 1330(1) and 1301(f).
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court, sitting in law, has no admiralty jurisdiction except in diversity
and federal question cases; the court, sitting in admiralty, has original
jurisdiction without more over admiralty causes, but trial by jury is
foreign to admiralty.
While the pattern is, as the Institute describes it, "fortuitous and
irrational," it has not worked much harm to claimants since the decision
in Fitzgerald v. United States Lines.5 3 In the Fitzgerald case, the Su-
preme Court established the rule that when an unseaworthiness or main-
tenance and cure action is brought in the alternative with a Jones Act
case in federal court, the claimant is entitled to trial by jury, through
the provisions of the Jones Act, on all counts. The right persists even
though the claimant is unsuccessful in the Jones Act case. The Fitzgerald
doctrine has been extended by lower courts in two recent cases. The
Third Circuit, in Haskins v. Point Towing Co.,54 applied the doctrine
in a case in which the maintenance and cure action was brought in ad-
miralty on the admiralty "side" of the court, and a Pennsylvania dis-
trict court, in Close v. Calmar Steamship Corp.,55 applied the doctrine
to grant a jury trial on an admiralty indemnity action that had been
consolidated with a longshoreman's negligence action based upon di-
versity jurisdiction. In the Haskins case, 6 the decision was based upon
a "court-created right" to trial by jury in such cases. The manner in
which the courts have readily extended this "court-created right" in-
dicates that the jury trial bar under existing law is of little significance.
The Institute's proposal recognizes the irrationality of the present
pattern and codifies and extends the Fitzgerald doctrine by granting a
right to trial by jury in all admiralty and maritime issues if the relief
sought is limited to money damages for personal injuries or death." The
conclusion is based upon the rationale that some admiralty causes, such
as maritime collisions and commercial matters, require the expertise of
the federal judge, theoretically skilled in admiralty, and other admiralty
causes, like tort and compensation matters, do not require this expertise.
The Institute's proposal to bar jury trials in limitation of liability
cases 58 is subject to criticism. The proposal denies jury trial in such
actions except in the few limited instances in which jury trial now is
granted by judicial precedent; such instances generally involve either
a single claimant or a limitation fund in excess of the total claims. A
review of the early decisions indicates that the courts in restricting
jury trials in limitation actions were primarily worried about the re-
sulting mutiplicity of actions. Under present law a limitation proceeding
is on the admiralty side of federal court; and since jury trial can not
53. 374 U.S. 16 (1963).
54. 395 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1968).
55. 44 F.R.D. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1968). See note 5 supra.
56. 395 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1968).
57. Proposed § 1319, reproduced in the appendix, infra.
58. Id.
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be had there, any claimant entitled to a jury trial must proceed under
the common law remedy, probably in state court. A duplicity of actions
was the inevitable result, with the first trial in state court, or on the
"law side" of federal court, to a jury, and the second trial, in the lim-
itation proceeding, in admiralty, to a judge. If the Institute's proposal
granting trial by jury in all admiralty tort and compensation causes in
federal court is adopted, the reason for withholding jury trials in lim-
itation actions may lose its force. There appear to be no insurmountable
problems involved. If a limitation action is tried solely to a judge, the
judge, consciously or not, must make two decisions: he must determine
the judgment value of each claim, and then he must pro-rate the claims
according to the amount of the fund. Since under the Institute's pro-
posed revision no duplicity of actions will result, why not allow the first
decision, the determination of the judgment value of the claims, to be
made by a jury? After a jury determination of the value of the claims,
the trial judge can pass upon the limitation action and pro-rate the lim-
itation fund among the judgment creditors. This method of procedure,
which recently was approved by the Seventh Circuit,59 will be partic-
ularly helpful in those cases where there are other defendants not af-
fected by the limitation action, and where the limiting owner's liability
policy is in excess of the limitation fund. In such cases, the present In-
stitute proposal may result in unnecessary duplication of trials, or denial
of trial by jury to claims that will not be affected by the limitation
action. The right of trial by jury is an extremely valuable one to a per-
sonal injury claimant and should not be withheld, especially in those
cases where the granting of the right will not unduly impede the admin-
istration of justice.
IX. DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
Much of what may be accomplished by the Institute's proposal for
concurrent jurisdiction in admiralty tort and compensation matters may
be undercut by the Institute's retention of the concept of diversity ju-
risdiction, since continuation of the illogical concept inevitably will
result in keeping in the federal courts many tort and compensation mat-
ters that, as we have seen, do not belong there.
Much has been written in support and in condemnation of diversity
jurisdiction, and a full discussion of all of the arguments is beyond the
scope of this analysis. An evaluation of the Institute's proposals for
revision of the division of admiralty tort and compensation jurisdiction
would be incomplete, however, without a criticism of the retention of
the diversity concept and a rebuttal of the arguments the Institute ap-
parently embraced in reaching its decision to retain the concept.
The Institute apparently bases its decision to retain diversity ju-
59. Famiano v. Enyeart, 398 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1968).
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risdiction primarily on the strength of these premises: (1) state court
judges and juries are incompetent or are unable fairly to deal with cases
between citizens of the state of the forum and citizens of other states;
(2) state court tribunals generally are inefficient, and (3) an unsuc-
cessful litigant in the courts of a state other than his domicile will be
likely to blame the loss of the lawsuit upon bias of the "foreign" court,
with resulting "friction and divisiveness among the several states and
their citizens."6 The weakness of each of these premises quickly can
be demonstrated.
Federal courts are in operation in every area of the nation, and
the judge of each court usually is a lifelong resident of the area in which
he serves; in many instances, he was the state court judge in the area
prior to his selection as a federal judge. Federal juries are composed
of the same people who are called to serve on state juries in the area,
particularly since the federal system of preferential jury lists has been
abolished. The Institute points out that federal jurors are drawn from
a larger area and thus are more broadly based; from this it is inferred
that they give sounder verdicts. Such an inference would have some
validity if we assume that a broader-based jury would of necessity be
a fairer or more intelligent one, but we cannot assume that a jury com-
posed of urban and rural jurors usually will be more intelligent or im-
partial than a jury composed solely of urban jurors. The territorial
jurisdictions of federal courts usually will yield more intelligent and
more competent jury venires than usually are found in state courts in
rural areas, but state courts in many urban areas are much more likely
to produce "better" jurors than will the federal courts sitting in those
areas. Thus it is difficult to follow the logic of the Institute that a fed-
eral forum will give an out-of-state defendant a judge and a jury free
of prejudice against outsiders, but that a state court will not.
The Institute assumes that the federal judiciary is superior to the
state judiciary primarily because life tenure gives a federal judge "a
degree of independence . . . which a state judge, facing re-election, may
find it hard to maintain."'" Unfortunately, life tenure also may allow
a federal judge to continue to serve on the bench after attaining a degree
of senility or other incompetence. 62 It should be noted, also, that there is
some merit in the argument that while judges should not be immersed in
politics, they should not, in view of their policy-making roles and the ple-
nary power they sometimes possess, be totally immune to the will of
60. ALl, STUDY OFr THE DIVISioN OF JURISDIcTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS,
Part 1, 53 (Official Draft, 1965).
61. Id. at 48.
62. The federal bench apparently occupies a position of pre-eminence in the ,American
judicial system, but its right to the position may be questionable. For a realistic appraisal
of the federal judiciary and an acknowledgement that it is not immune to dishonesty and
incompetence, see Tydings, The Congress and the Courts: Helping the Judiciary to Help
Itself, 52 A.B.A.J. 321 (1966).
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the people. Both the federal plan of appointment for life and the tra-
ditional state plan of election of judges leave much to be desired. While
there is little hope for improvement in the federal plan, because a con-
stitutional amendment would be required to remove the present life
tenure protection of federal judges, the traditional state method of se-
lecting the judiciary is undergoing improvement. Evidence of this is the
success of the "Missouri Plan," which provides for nonpartisan ap-
pointment of judges, with periodic confirmation by the electorate on a
non-party basis. The plan has been adopted in over one-fifth of the states,
and about ten additional states are in the process of adoption or have
such a plan under consideration.' Thus if either judiciary can be said
to be improving, it is the state judiciary. It is doubtful whether the fed-
eral judiciary now enjoys much superiority over the state judiciary;
what advantage it may now enjoy may be a rapidly diminishing one.
It must be conceded that federal court procedure is more efficient
and more modern than the judicial procedures of many of the states.
One cannot assume, however, that the gap between the efficiency of the
federal system and that of the state system as a whole is significantly
large, or that it will widen in the future. Many states have overhauled
their procedural machinery in recent years; some have patterned the
new machinery after the federal process. In the past 29 years, 23 states
have adopted new procedural rules or codes based closely upon the fed-
eral rules, and 10 other states have had complete revisions of their pro-
cedure. 4 In view of these developments, the Institute's contention that
efficiency in procedural machinery is a significant consideration in the
decision to retain diversity jurisdiction is of doubtful merit.
The premise that friction between the several states and their cit-
izens is substantially promoted by unsuccessful litigation in the courts
of one state by citizens of another state is equally debatable. Assuming
that empirical knowledge would support such a contention, such knowl-
edge also is likely to support the assumption that unsuccessful litigants
in "spite" suits are the ones most likely to foster such friction, and that
"spite" suits usually involve small amounts of money or things of little
pecuniary value. Diversity jurisdiction, since it applies only to claims
amounting to $10,000 or more, does not rescue most of these "spite"
actions from state courts, and hence diversity jurisdiction may not reach
the root of whatever "friction" problem that might exist. Assuming,
arguendo, that diversity jurisdiction does reduce the friction and di-
visiveness among the several states and their citizens, it is probable that
the good which is done is outweighed or at least counterbalanced by the
63. See Hall, The Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan: A Quarter Century Review, 33
U. Mo. K.C.L. REv. 163 (1965). While "many distinguished leaders of the bar" favor adop-
tion of the Missouri Plan for the federal judiciary, some authorities oppose the adoption.
See Wright, The Federal Courts-A Century After Appomattox, 52 A.B.A.J. 742, 743 (1966).
64. See Wright, Procedural Reform: Its Limitations and Its Future, 1 GA. L. REv. 563,
564 (1967).
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harm done to federal unity by a procedural system under which federal
courts daily are required to usurp traditional state court duties.
Finally, even if we assume that the Institute's arguments against
state court efficiency and competency-the "machinations of the local
court house gang"65 and the like-are valid, such arguments would sup-
port the concept of a single court system under federal control, or an-
other kind of diversity jurisdiction, but they do not support the present
diversity concept which the Institute wants to continue. If diversity is
essential to justice, why is there a minimum limit of $10,000? Those
who support diversity jurisdiction in its present form evidently feel that
the federal government should insure against the inefficiency, incom-
petence and prejudice of state courts only where enough money is in-
volved. Justice, to them, apparently is a sometimes thing.
X. REMOVAL
Under existing law, any admiralty tort or compensation cause, ex-
cept a Jones Act case, may be removed from state court to federal court
if the requirements of diversity of citizenship and jurisdictional amount
are met. In its revision of this jurisdiction, the Institute plans to retain
diversity jurisdiction and the removal of diversity causes.66 The effect
will be a continued diverting to federal courts of admiralty tort and com-
pensation cases that properly belong in state courts and initially are
brought there.
As we have seen, the concept of diversity jurisdiction is indefen-
sible; the concept of removal from state to federal court because of di-
versity jurisdiction is equally indefensible. In the area of admiralty tort
and compensation jurisdiction, the matter is made more indefensible
because removal is permitted for all actions except those arising under
the Jones Act. The Institute admits the irrationality of the present re-
moval pattern, 7 but plans to retain it. It is disappointing that the In-
stitute, given the opportunity to eliminate removal in admiralty tort and
compensation cases, or, alternatively, to eliminate the illogical dichotomy
of removability among those cases, has chosen to do neither.
Equally disappointing is the failure of the Institute to codify the
holding in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.68 that an
admiralty case is not such a cause "arising under the Constitution, laws
or treaties of the United States" as to be removable, without more, to
65. ALI, STUDY OF THE DrvIsIoN OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS,
Part 1, 52 (Official Draft 1965).
66. Proposed §§ 1317(a), 1304(a) and 1301.
67. The same policies that dictate not allowing Jones Act litigation to be removed
would seem equally applicable to suits under the Death on the High Seas Act
or to any other action for personal injuries or death within the scope of the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVIsioN OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 155
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1968).
68. 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
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to federal courts. A forceful argument had been made in Romero that
since admiralty jurisdiction is expressly granted to Congress in the Con-
stitution,6" and since the present removal statute70 grants removal, with-
out more, to claims arising under the Constitution, all admiralty causes
are removable of right to federal courts, regardless of the amount in
controversy or the citizenship of the parties. A slim majority (four jus-
tices dissented) of the Supreme Court rejected the argument in the
Romero case.
None of the Institute's proposed articles contains express language
to the effect that an admiralty cause shall not be removable solely be-
cause it arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United
States. The Institute apparently is content to rely upon the holding in
Romero and the Institute's belief, stated in the official commentary,71
that a case like Romero will not be removable under the proposed sec-
tions. A study of the Institute's removal provisions and a close look at
the Romero case indicate that the Institute's choice may not be a wise
one.
Under the Institute's plan, Proposed Section 1317(a) provides
that an admiralty matter may be removed if removal is authorized by
Section 1312. Section 1312(a) provides that a civil action may be re-
moved if the action might have been brought in federal court under
Section 1311. Section 1311 (a) provides that all civil actions in which the
initial pleading sets forth a substantial claim arising under the Consti-
tution, laws or treaties of the United States may be brought in federal
court.
Thus the same forceful argument that was made in Romero can
be urged again upon the adoption of the revision. The Institute may
feel that a possible construction of Section 1317 bars such an argument.
Section 1317 provides that "a civil action .,. . that might have been
brought in a district court under Section 1316 ... is not for that reason
removable." There is no language in Section 1316, however, referring
to cases arising under the Constitution of the United States; the most
plausible construction of the two proposed sections is that these matters
are not removable solely because they are admiralty matters and within
original federal court jurisdiction. This is not the equivalent of saying
that they are not removable solely because they are matters arising
under the Constitution.
In a like manner, reliance upon Romero may be unwise. A study
of the case reveals that (1) both the majority and the dissenters felt that
the language of Sections 1331 and 1441 of Title 28 of the United States
Code clearly supported the removability argument,72 (2) the lower courts
69. See p. 29 supra.
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
71. ALI, STUDY OF THE DiVISiON OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
154 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1968).
72. 358 U.S. at 378-79.
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had been divided in their interpretation of this effect of the two sections
prior to Romero, and (3) the Romero case was a five-to-four decision,
with all four dissenters but only one of the majority still sitting.
For these reasons, it would appear prudent to include in proposed
Section 1317 (a) a provision that no cause shall be considered as arising
under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States solely be-
cause it is an admiralty or maritime cause.
73
While the removal proposal is somewhat disappointing, it does elim-
inate two undesirable features of the present law. In recent years the
diversity of citizenship requirement has lost some of its force because
in a great majority of the cases the tortfeasor was insured by an insurer
domiciled outside of the state; the insurer could and would use his di-
versity of citizenship to effect removal. The Institute proposal provides
that an insurer cannot use its diverse citizenship for the purpose of re-
moval when it has maintained an office in the state in which the action is
brought for a period of two years or more preceding the commencement
of the action.
74
The Institute proposal also remedies a wrong by permitting re-
moval of cases of exclusive federal jurisdiction that are erroneously
commenced in state court. Removal of such causes has been denied under
the theory that jurisdiction on removal is a derivative jurisdiction.
Therefore, if the state court lacks jurisdiction over the case, the federal
court to which the case is removed is without jurisdiction even though
the federal court could have jurisdiction if the matter had been orig-
inally brought there. 75 Under this theory any admiralty cause of exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction could not be removed to federal court from
state court. The Institute's proposal removes this doctrine from admi-
ralty causes.76
XI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The American Law Institute's proposals for revision of the allo-
cation of admiralty tort and compensation jurisdiction between federal
and state courts make several meaningful and well-reasoned changes.
73. The Romero holding hinges upon an interpretation of the present law (28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1964)); amendment of the section, by adoption of proposed Article 1311, could
result in a reinterpretation of the question in the light of the new legislation. In such a
case, the Supreme Court easily could find that the language of proposed §§ 1317(a),
1312 (a) (1) and 1311(a) are clear and unambiguous and allow removal of all admiralty tort
and compensation cases without more. If the language is clear, there would be no need to
refer to the ALI commentary to discover intent. The American Law Institute's intent may
be subtly to leave the matter open for a reversal of Romero. See ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVI-
SION OF JURISDICTIoN BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 87 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1968).
74. Proposed § 1302(b). Existing law [28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1964)] provides only that
an insurer cannot use its diverse citizenship in the state of its incorporation or the state in
which it has its principal place of business, except in suits under direct action statutes.
75. See Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939).
76. Proposed § 1317(b) ; see appendix infra.
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If the proposals do not eliminate all of the major problems, it is partly
because many of the major problems are caused by substantive defor-
mities, and revision of these is beyond the scope of a procedural revision.
There are forceful arguments for exclusive state jurisdiction in
this area, and it is hoped that serious study of such a reallocation will
be made in the immediate future. Such a reallocation more nearly would
accomplish the goal of getting out of the federal system many of the
cases that do not belong there. A conversion to exclusive state jurisdic-
tion would require many changes of mixed substantive and procedural
character, and such a sweeping reallocation probably also was beyond
the scope of the Institute's study." The present advocacy of concurrent
jurisdiction by the Institute, however, is a step in the direction of ex-
clusive state jurisdiction, although the value of the step is limited by
the continuation of diversity jurisdiction. It is unfortunate that the In-
stitute sees fit to continue this concept.
If adopted, the revision will assist the courts in veering away from
the unacceptable "locality alone" doctrine in the field of admiralty tort
law, and will remove the residue of the injustices caused by irrational
allocation of jury trials to admiralty claimants. The proposals also will
be useful as a codification of existing procedural law. Within the limits
inherent in a procedural revision and the self-imposed restraint of the
diversity concept, the American Law Institute has formulated a plan
of reallocation of jurisdiction that, if adopted, will benefit those who
deal with or are affected by admiralty tort and compensation law.
APPENDIX
Sections ProDosed by the American Law Institute
For Reallocation of Admiralty Jurisdiction
Between State and Federal Courts
Section 1316. Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; original jurisdiction;
exclusive jurisdiction.
(a) Except as provided in section 1330 of this title, the district
courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in con-
troversy of: (1) all civil actions of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;
and (2) any prize brought into the United States and all proceedings
for the condemnation of property taken as prize. Unless otherwise pro-
vided by Act of Congress, the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction does
not include a claim merely because it arose on navigable waters.
(b) The jurisdiction of the district courts under this section shall
77. The concept of due process probably would limit jurisdiction to the state in which
the tort occurs, or a state which has "power" over a defendant. Extra-state service of
process and enforcement of a judgment of one state against a defendant domiciled in another
state also suggest problems and procedural delays. Such a plan might also require review by
the Supreme Court of cases that now are being reviewed by the federal courts of appeal prior
to any Supreme Court review. There are feasible solutions to most if not all of these prob-
lems; however, discussion of these solutions is beyond the scope of this study.
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
be exclusive of the courts of the States in actions for limitation of liabil-
ity under sections 183 to 189 of Title 46 and in maritime actions in rem,
whether arising under the general maritime law or to enforce liens given
by Act of Congress or by a statute of a State. In all other actions within
subsection (a) of this section, jurisdiction of the district courts shall
be concurrent with the courts of the States.
Section 1317. Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; removal of actions
brought in State courts.
(a) A civil action brought in a State court that might have been
brought in a district court under section 1316 of this title is not for that
reason removable but may be removed to the district court of the United
States for the district embracing the place where such action is pending
if removal is authorized by subsection (b) of this section or sections
1304, 1312, or 1322 of this title.
(b) Any civil action brought in a court of a State of which the dis-
trict courts of the United States have exclusive jurisdiction under sec-
tion 1316(b) of this title may be removed by any party at any time to
the district court of the United States for the district embracing the
place where such action is pending and, except as provided in section
1315(b) of this title, shall proceed as if properly commenced therein.
Section 1319. Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; trial by jury.
In any action commenced in or removed to a district court under
sections 1316 or 1317 of this title, except for actions for limitation of
liability under sections 183 to 189 of Title 46, the trial of all issues of
fact of any claim arising out of personal injuries or death in which the
relief sought is limited to money damages shall be by jury if any party
demands it. In all other actions so commenced in or removed to a dis-
trict court, there shall be no right to jury trial unless the requirements
for jurisdiction under sections 1301, 1302 and 1304 or sections 1311
and 1312 of this title are satisfied and a right to trial by jury would exist
without regard to this section.
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